The other development, starting with the Roosevelt years, is the tremendous transfer of power from the elected congress to an unelected and unaccountable alphabet soup of executive administrative agencies--EPA, OSHA, FTC, FERC, SEC, ICC (now STB), for that matter IRS. These agencies combine legislative, executive, and judicial functions, and exercise immense, almost unchecked, power within their areas of jurisdiction--which they have great latitude and incentive to expand almost without limit.

Te Supreme Court has granted cert to hear a case, Lucia v. SEC, on appeal from the DC Circuit, that has a chance to knock over the apple cart on this power. Basically, Lucia is appealing a penalty from the SEC, on the basis that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who heard the case is an officer of the federal government, and as such was not properly appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. If Lucia succeeds on appeal, literally thousands of cases could be overturned. It's a novel theory, and I sincerely hope Lucia succeeds. I have opposed the ALJ process because I don't see how an ALJ, who reports ultimately to the executive director of the agency, can fulfill the procedural due process requirement for a hearing before an impartial tribunal.

I have proposed replacing ALJs who are captive within the agency with either 1) an independent office of administrative hearings to which the ALJs would report (Texas and Oregon have this), or better 2) separate Article III administrative law courts, such as most of Europe has. I've discussed this with Rand, but we've never gotten together on a specific proposal. Lucia may open the door.