(07-07-2020 01:25 PM)vandiver49 Wrote:  At the point, the Carrier force is better off canceling the Ford program. Finish the JFK and the new Enterprise and refuel the current Nimitz's. As for the Amphibs, I've got bad new for you, the Navy's ship procurement has killed that mission.

Yep, the LHAs/LHDs pretty much killed the amphib mission. Funny, China is building bunches of amphibs, and just about everybody else has upgraded that area, and here we are killing it. Kind of like we did with ASW 30 years ago.

Quote:Besides, we aren't rolling up on beaches anymore, we need a force that can secure deep water ports. I don't really see that happening without the USAF.

The problem with deep water ports is that the bad guys know their value too and defend them to the teeth, and the approach is usually restricted enough to limit the size of the force you can bring in. It may be easier to land on a less heavily defended beach, establish a beachhead, and bring in a big enough force to seize the ports. Normandy was really about seizing Cherbourg and LeHavre. Going directly into either would have been hard, but the allies were able to consolidate the beachhead, bring in more troops and equipment, and Cherbourg fell before the end of June and Le Havre in September. I read somewhere that from the time we got Cherbourg back into working order until the end of the war, it was the busiest port in the world.

And a USAF attack may work, but it probably means destruction of what made the port important to begin with. And until you get in there on he ground, you can't do much about repairing and rebuilding that.

(07-07-2020 01:12 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  

(07-07-2020 12:35 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  Im fine with most of what your proposing---but I have no interest in another NATO where we pay most of the expenses and carry the vast majority of some new coalition defense force. I have no issue with the fleet docking or maintaining a presence at Pac-Allied ports or maintaining our current bases in the region. I just have no interest in another huge S Korea/NATO type deployment. If we move troops out of the Middle East---the point is to bring them home.

I not only bring them home, I put a bunch of them into the reserves. It seems to me that one of our big problems is that if we have a bunch of active duty soldiers sitting around getting paid for doing nothing, that creates a huge incentive for us to go looking for a war so we can put them to work. The key to affording a big military is keeping a lot of it at a reduced state of readiness until needed. Readiness costs a fortune.

I'm basically talking about a presence mission in WestPac. I think that's all we need to keep China in check. Then just let their internal issues tear them apart.

Quote:What I'd like to see is more integration with the Aussies, Japanese, Koreans and other Pacific nations. Id like to see more of the small Lighting type carriers that utilize the F-35B in use for those allied navies. Those would be fantastic force multipliers for the region as they can link to just about everything in the US arsenal. I know the Japanese are already moving in that directions and the Aussies are revisiting the F-35B option for their helicopter carriers. Hopefully both move that direction in a big way. If they do, that will help give the US Navy some real help in the region (especially given the Ford carriers are still apparently having issues).

With respect to carriers in particular, looks like the Fords are costing us about $14B each by the time we get everything working. The Navy likes to talk about how wonderful the Fords are (if everything works, of course). There is a lecture by CAPT Tal Manvel, who headed up the Ford development team in the early years, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kIjvNCFXCjs. What is interesting is that he goes into great detail about all the improvements, but nowhere talks about opportunity costs.

The last Nimitz cost about $8B, so we can probably build another Nimitz or a RAND CVN-LX (from the RAND study of future carrier alternatives) for $9B in today's dollars. So there is $5-6B of opportunity cost in each Ford. We can convert the LHAs/LHDs to full time "Lightning Carriers" or the RAND CV-LX by converting the troop and equipment spaces, and well decks for those that have them, into additional hangar and aircraft maintenance spaces, to get about 40 aircraft onboard, for probably something like $2B, or build new ones for about $4B. Or we could go a little further and upgrade them as proposed by CSBA--add sponsons, angled deck, and waist cats, and put a ski jump on bow, so it can handle everything in our inventory and maybe get 50 aircraft onboard. That's more expensive, probably $3B for conversion or $5B from ground up. We could probably build a Queen Elizabeth with cats and traps for around $5B or a modernized Kitty Hawk for around $6B. QE probably carries up to 50 aircraft, and the Kitty carried 90 back in the day. Build the Kitty with waist cats only and a ski jump and you lose a little parking room, maybe you can only carry 80, but that's all we are looking for with the Fords.

So lets's assume we go for the top of the line here and build another Nimitz and a Kitty. That's two carriers for $15B, or roughly half the cost of two Fords, and they can carry the same 160 aircraft. We could then fill out an escort squadron with a cruiser ($4B), 2 AAW destroyers like Burkes ($2B each or $4B total), 3 GP escorts like the FFG(X) ($1.2B each, $3.6B total), and 4 ASW frigates like upgraded Knoxes or Perrys ($500MM each, $2B total). So for $28.6B, we have not only two carriers that can haul 90 aircraft each, but we also have a 10-ship escort squadron. Whatever advantages the Fords convey (many of which can be back fitted onto Nimitzes and Kittys), are they worth the opportunity cost? I think not.

I like converting the LHAs/LHDs for at least interim carriers because they are basically worthless as amphibs. When I was in gator navy, we criticized the move because putting all your eggs in one basket means one torpedo or missile hit can take out your whole assault force. But it's actually worse than that. Because of that risk, the Navy has determined that they have to operate at least 25-50 miles offshore. From that distance, the only effective ship-to-shore connectors are helos or V-22s, neither of which can carry tanks or heavy artillery. That means that all the Marines can put ashore are light infantry--very light infantry. That means they can't get much done, and if you've followed any of the news on that subject, the Commandant of the Marines is obviously struggling to come up with an answer to that problem.

And as far as opportunity cost, you can build a whole amphibious squadron--smaller LHA/LHD like Spanish Juan Carlos, LPH like French Mistral, LPD/LSD like British Albion, LST with a conventional LST bow, LPA/LKA, and a naval gunfire support frigate, for about the cost of one LHA/LHD. The trick to saving a bunch of money on amphibs is living with an 18 knot SOA instead of 20. Those extra 2 knots are extremely expensive, and they pretty much eliminate the conventional LST that can beach, because you just can't drive that hull through the water that fast, no matter how much power you apply. It was described to me as like driving a nail head first.

I was a big fan of ADM Zumwalt's "high/low" approach to shipbuilding. Build some top-of-the-line, state-of-the-art ships for sure, but flesh out the numbers with cheaper ships based on proved and simpler technology. I actually thought the Knoxes and Perrys were badly underpowered and undergunned. But they turned out to be good ASW platforms, and that was huge in winning the Cold War. Building a cheaper carrier (actually two cheaper carriers) and spending the savings on building escorts, particularly ASW escorts (an area where we are currently weak, in part because we disposed of over 40 Perrys prematurely), makes a lot more sense to me from an opportunity cost standpoint. Same with the amphibs. A bunch of smaller and cheaper and more versatile ships that can actually come in to 3-5 miles offshore and do a real amphibious assault makes a lot more sense to me.

I actually like that idea a lot. I just dont see how one Ford will "out sortie" a Nimitz and a Kitty together--not to mention, one Ford cant be at two places at one time no matter how advanced she is (assuming they ever get the silly thing to work properly). I also would love to know where they are with the TERN program.

For those that dont know, the TERN is a Navy drone flying wing type aircraft with 2 counter-rotating propellers on its nose that can land on its tail. So, sitting upright on its tail, it can take off vertically like a helicopter and then transition into normal level conventional winged flight. Last I saw it would have a 1,000 pound pay load and a 1200 mile range. That means if could carry all sorts of recon equipment and ordinance. It could potentially even carry something as large as the Naval Strike Missile (which weighs less than 1000 pounds). Supposedly, the thing folds up into something small enough that a small combatant like the Littoral Combat Ship could carry 2 of them in addition to its normal 2 helicopters. The idea was to turn virtually every ship in the inventory into a potential small aircraft carrier. There are all sorts of exciting possibilities that exist if you have something like that available on most ships. Its the type of relatively low cost innovation that can vastly expand the capabilities of darn near any ship we currently have.

(07-07-2020 02:28 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(07-07-2020 01:12 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  

(07-07-2020 12:35 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  Im fine with most of what your proposing---but I have no interest in another NATO where we pay most of the expenses and carry the vast majority of some new coalition defense force. I have no issue with the fleet docking or maintaining a presence at Pac-Allied ports or maintaining our current bases in the region. I just have no interest in another huge S Korea/NATO type deployment. If we move troops out of the Middle East---the point is to bring them home.

I not only bring them home, I put a bunch of them into the reserves. It seems to me that one of our big problems is that if we have a bunch of active duty soldiers sitting around getting paid for doing nothing, that creates a huge incentive for us to go looking for a war so we can put them to work. The key to affording a big military is keeping a lot of it at a reduced state of readiness until needed. Readiness costs a fortune.

I'm basically talking about a presence mission in WestPac. I think that's all we need to keep China in check. Then just let their internal issues tear them apart.

Quote:What I'd like to see is more integration with the Aussies, Japanese, Koreans and other Pacific nations. Id like to see more of the small Lighting type carriers that utilize the F-35B in use for those allied navies. Those would be fantastic force multipliers for the region as they can link to just about everything in the US arsenal. I know the Japanese are already moving in that directions and the Aussies are revisiting the F-35B option for their helicopter carriers. Hopefully both move that direction in a big way. If they do, that will help give the US Navy some real help in the region (especially given the Ford carriers are still apparently having issues).

With respect to carriers in particular, looks like the Fords are costing us about $14B each by the time we get everything working. The Navy likes to talk about how wonderful the Fords are (if everything works, of course). There is a lecture by CAPT Tal Manvel, who headed up the Ford development team in the early years, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kIjvNCFXCjs. What is interesting is that he goes into great detail about all the improvements, but nowhere talks about opportunity costs.

The last Nimitz cost about $8B, so we can probably build another Nimitz or a RAND CVN-LX (from the RAND study of future carrier alternatives) for $9B in today's dollars. So there is $5-6B of opportunity cost in each Ford. We can convert the LHAs/LHDs to full time "Lightning Carriers" or the RAND CV-LX by converting the troop and equipment spaces, and well decks for those that have them, into additional hangar and aircraft maintenance spaces, to get about 40 aircraft onboard, for probably something like $2B, or build new ones for about $4B. Or we could go a little further and upgrade them as proposed by CSBA--add sponsons, angled deck, and waist cats, and put a ski jump on bow, so it can handle everything in our inventory and maybe get 50 aircraft onboard. That's more expensive, probably $3B for conversion or $5B from ground up. We could probably build a Queen Elizabeth with cats and traps for around $5B or a modernized Kitty Hawk for around $6B. QE probably carries up to 50 aircraft, and the Kitty carried 90 back in the day. Build the Kitty with waist cats only and a ski jump and you lose a little parking room, maybe you can only carry 80, but that's all we are looking for with the Fords.

So lets's assume we go for the top of the line here and build another Nimitz and a Kitty. That's two carriers for $15B, or roughly half the cost of two Fords, and they can carry the same 160 aircraft. We could then fill out an escort squadron with a cruiser ($4B), 2 AAW destroyers like Burkes ($2B each or $4B total), 3 GP escorts like the FFG(X) ($1.2B each, $3.6B total), and 4 ASW frigates like upgraded Knoxes or Perrys ($500MM each, $2B total). So for $28.6B, we have not only two carriers that can haul 90 aircraft each, but we also have a 10-ship escort squadron. Whatever advantages the Fords convey (many of which can be back fitted onto Nimitzes and Kittys), are they worth the opportunity cost? I think not.

I like converting the LHAs/LHDs for at least interim carriers because they are basically worthless as amphibs. When I was in gator navy, we criticized the move because putting all your eggs in one basket means one torpedo or missile hit can take out your whole assault force. But it's actually worse than that. Because of that risk, the Navy has determined that they have to operate at least 25-50 miles offshore. From that distance, the only effective ship-to-shore connectors are helos or V-22s, neither of which can carry tanks or heavy artillery. That means that all the Marines can put ashore are light infantry--very light infantry. That means they can't get much done, and if you've followed any of the news on that subject, the Commandant of the Marines is obviously struggling to come up with an answer to that problem.

And as far as opportunity cost, you can build a whole amphibious squadron--smaller LHA/LHD like Spanish Juan Carlos, LPH like French Mistral, LPD/LSD like British Albion, LST with a conventional LST bow, LPA/LKA, and a naval gunfire support frigate, for about the cost of one LHA/LHD. The trick to saving a bunch of money on amphibs is living with an 18 knot SOA instead of 20. Those extra 2 knots are extremely expensive, and they pretty much eliminate the conventional LST that can beach, because you just can't drive that hull through the water that fast, no matter how much power you apply. It was described to me as like driving a nail head first.

I was a big fan of ADM Zumwalt's "high/low" approach to shipbuilding. Build some top-of-the-line, state-of-the-art ships for sure, but flesh out the numbers with cheaper ships based on proved and simpler technology. I actually thought the Knoxes and Perrys were badly underpowered and undergunned. But they turned out to be good ASW platforms, and that was huge in winning the Cold War. Building a cheaper carrier (actually two cheaper carriers) and spending the savings on building escorts, particularly ASW escorts (an area where we are currently weak, in part because we disposed of over 40 Perrys prematurely), makes a lot more sense to me from an opportunity cost standpoint. Same with the amphibs. A bunch of smaller and cheaper and more versatile ships that can actually come in to 3-5 miles offshore and do a real amphibious assault makes a lot more sense to me.

I actually like that idea a lot. I just dont see how one Ford will "out sortie" a Nimitz and a Kitty together--not to mention, one Ford cant be at two places at one time no matter how advanced she is (assuming they ever get the silly thing to work properly). I also would love to know where they are with the TERN program.

For those that dont know, the TERN is a Navy drone flying wing type aircraft with 2 counter-rotating propellers on its nose that can land on its tail. So, sitting upright on its tail, it can take off vertically like a helicopter and then transition into normal level conventional winged flight. Last I saw it would have a 1,000 pound pay load and a 1200 mile range. That means if could carry all sorts of recon equipment and ordinance. It could potentially even carry something as large as the Naval Strike Missile (which weighs less than 1000 pounds). Supposedly, the thing folds up into something small enough that a small combatant like the Littoral Combat Ship could carry 2 of them in addition to its normal 2 helicopters. The idea was to turn virtually every ship in the inventory into a potential small aircraft carrier. There are all sorts of exciting possibilities that exist if you have something like that available on most ships. Its the type of relatively low cost innovation that can vastly expand the capabilities of darn near any ship we currently have.

We are still going to need a lot of weapons capability which is not reliant upon satellites.

(07-07-2020 02:28 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  I actually like that idea a lot. I just dont see how one Ford will "out sortie" a Nimitz and a Kitty together--not to mention, one Ford cant be at two places at one time no matter how advanced she is (assuming they ever get the silly thing to work properly). I also would love to know where they are with the TERN program.

The WWII doctrine was that you needed 4 carriers for an effective carrier strike. They usually had 2 big carriers working with 2 escort or jeep carriers. My idea is that a single carrier battle group (CVBG) would include two carriers--a Nimitz and a cheaper carrier (Kitty or one of the other options). Plus an escort squadron of at least 1 cruiser, 2 AAW destroyers, 3 GP escorts, and 4 ASW frigates. So two CVBGs would constitute a strike force. That would include 20 escorts, and doctrine is that you need somewhere between 27 and 38, so you'd need to add some escorts.

Quote:For those that dont know, the TERN is a Navy drone flying wing type aircraft with 2 counter-rotating propellers on its nose that can land on its tail. So, sitting upright on its tail, it can take off vertically like a helicopter and then transition into normal level conventional winged flight. Last I saw it would have a 1,000 pound pay load and a 1200 mile range. That means if could carry all sorts of recon equipment and ordinance. It could potentially even carry something as large as the Naval Strike Missile (which weighs less than 1000 pounds). Supposedly, the thing folds up into something small enough that a small combatant like the Littoral Combat Ship could carry 2 of them in addition to its normal 2 helicopters. The idea was to turn virtually every ship in the inventory into a potential small aircraft carrier. There are all sorts of exciting possibilities that exist if you have something like that available on most ships. Its the type of relatively low cost innovation that can vastly expand the capabilities of darn near any ship we currently have.

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a joke. Everything was sacrificed to get a 45 knot SOA, and there's really no well documented need for that much speed. It has a 57 mm popgun instead of a real gun. It was supposed to have an ASW module, but the engines are too noisy for sonar to work properly. It was supposed to have a mine countermeasures module, but that has never worked. It does have a helo flight deck, but it's made of aluminum (lightweight to get that speed) and so it can't handle anything but small helos. And that lightweight aluminum construction means that it can't take much of a hit. Doctrine as I understand it is that if you get hit you abandon ship.